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In the last few years the world in which Quantum Cryptography evolves has deeply changed. 
On the one side the revelations of Snowden, though he said nothing really new, made the 
world more aware of the importance to protect sensitive data from all kinds of adversaries, 
including sometimes “friends”. On the other side, breakthroughs in quantum computation, 
in particular in superconducting qubits and surface-codes, made it possible that in 15 to 25 
years there might be a quantum machine able to break today’s codes. This implies that in 
order to protect today’s data over a few decades, one has to act now and use some 
quantum-safe cryptography.  
Such a perspective is taken very seriously by the cryptography community who is looking for 
a quantum-safe alternative to today’s systems. 
Quantum-safe cryptography covers all cryptography systems that resist to quantum attacks. 
As in today’s cryptography, this covers both complexity-based protocols and provably secure 
systems. The first ones consists in merely replacing the problem on which RSA rests (i.e. 
factoring) by another problem claimed to be intractable both for classical and for quantum 
computers, as factoring was claimed to be intractable. This approach has the great 
advantage of being flexible, cost-effective and relatively similar to today’s approach, hence 
security experts don’t need to change much. But it has the great drawback that one is again 
betting on the unknown to secure our information-based society. Provably secure 
cryptography requires that one exploit physics, more precisely quantum physics, a relatively 
expensive and different approach, but a real paradigm shift. 
Complexity-based protocols, like e.g. lattice based encryption, will certainly find large 
markets in everyday applications. Yet, even for this low end of the market, quantum 
technologies have an important role to play. Indeed, all cryptography protocols require fresh 
random numbers and Snowden clearly established that one can’t count on pseudo-random 
number generators. Quantum offers guaranteed randomness. This can be made very handy, 
compact and cost effective. It would be absurd not to use Quantum Random Number 
Generators (QRNG) in all future cryptography applications. 
Provably secure cryptography combines a physical layer for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), 
QRNG and a large part of classical algorithms to provide ultra-long time confidentiality. Here 
one should always emphasize that a glitch in complexity based cryptography break not only 
future communication, but also all past communication, while QKD-based systems can only 
be attacked in real time. Hence, a glitch on a QKD-based system does not at all affect past 
communication and its effect on future communication depends on the detail of the 
hypothetical glitch. For example, if authentication is realized by a classical one-way function, 
then even if it the one-way function gets broken after a minute, this has no impact on the 
security since after a minute the QKD-based system has already gone on with a fresh round 
of bases choices. 
Quantum networks using Quantum Key Distribution and Trusted Nodes are being deployed 
in several countries (USA, China, Korea, UK, etc.). They provide a solid physical backbone on 
which to develop quantum-safe cryptography, especially for high security and long-term 
secrecy. Trusted node is a compromise. Today’s QKD is limited to a few hundreds of km [1], 
despite steady progress in reducing losses of optical fibers and in improving QKD protocols 
and engines. Quantum repeaters based on quantum teleportation and memories still need 
to be much improved before they will be useful for country-scale quantum networks (how 
long depends on the physicists creativity and the engineers budget). 
As QKD-based systems get more and more deployed, testing those systems becomes more 
and more important. Indeed, even if the principle of QKD is provably secure, implementation 
may have weaknesses. Let us emphasize again that the discovery of a weakness would not 
impact the security of past communication. I like to also emphasize that most – possibly all – 
weaknesses discovered so far, in particular about single-photon detectors, are essentially 
science-fiction attacks that require that the adversary has access during several hours to the 
inside of the QKD engine, so that he can fine tune some delicate parameters of his attack. 
Nevertheless, it is important to know about such attacks. The attacks exploiting the 
detectors are somewhat similar to those exploiting the photon-number Poisson distribution 
of the source: both can easily be counters by similar simple counter measures, decoy state 
for the latter and decoy detectors for the former. For example a well-implemented single-
photon detector with randomly varying detection efficiencies (at least 3 levels are required) 
allows one to mitigate attacks on the detectors [2]. Still, one should recognize that this is not 
a trivial task [3]. 
Research in QKD is still needed in three quite different directions. First, there is a need to 
improve the QKD protocols (including security proofs against individual and collective 
attacks) and the QKD engines, especially with a view on higher bit rates. A vision of a QKD 
engine producing 1 Gb/s of provably secret bits is on the horizon. Next, there is a beautiful 
research program on so-called Device Independent Quantum Information Processing (DIQIP) 
[4]. This connects to the fascinating physics of quantum nonlocality [5,6], but one should 
also focus on semi-DIQIP, i.e. on protocols where well-identified parts of the system are 
trusted. The third main research topic implies very nice experimental physics on light-matter 
interactions at the single-photon level for the development of quantum memories and 
repeaters. Each individual requirement for a quantum repeater (e.g. memory time, fidelity, 
efficiency, etc.) has been demonstrated, but in different and so far incompatible systems. 
Hence, the grand challenge here is, first, to find one system able to achieve all requirements 
and, next, to coordinate a large engineering program to assemble it into a functional 
quantum repeater for future continental scale quantum networks. 
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